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DERIVATIVE JURISDICTION
to preserve uniformity by the force of example."" Thus a decision to
reject the state law as the federal rule induces confusion regarding the
primary rules of conduct in two ways: first, by posing two laws on the
same subject and raising doubts about the viability of other state rules;
and second, by injecting imprecision through hurried opinions and con-
flicting decisions among the circuits.
When, as in Stadium Apartments, a court chooses to reject the
state law as the federal rule, it should face squarely the impact of that
decision on the certainty and clarity of its guides to future conduct,
especially in an area such as the law of property where the state law is
widely presumed to apply and in fact is applied to govern the relations of
the parties. The local rule should be rejected only when a sufficient federal
interest warrants intrusion into the traditional ambit of the local guides to
conduct and the resulting confusion for those who rely on them to plan
their future transactions is justified. In Stadium Apartments the con-
sequences to the federal system were not confronted directly nor was
there an adequate showing of the requisite federal interest to warrant
the result obtained.
KENNETH C. DAY
Federal Jurisdiction-Derivative Jurisdiction Upon Removal
"[P] rompt, economical, and sound administration of justice depends
upon definite and finally accepted principles governing important areas of
litigation, such as the respective jurisdictions of federal and state
courts .... ,1 One such principle is derivative jurisdiction in the removal
area; title 28, United States Code, section 14412 allows removal at de-
" Friendly, supra note 9, at 405. See also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in
the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. R-v. 157, 158 (1953).
2 American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,8 (1951). Defendant, who had
removed on grounds of diversity, lost on the merits in federal court. On appeal he
asked that the case be remanded because of jurisdictional shortcomings, and the
Court in an opinion written by Justice Reed granted his request, feeling that the
ends of justice would be better served through strict enforcement of jurisdictional
requirements.
. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) concerns actions removable generally:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant .. to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
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fendant's urging of any case from state court into federal court, provided
that the federal court had original jurisdiction.3 However, the federal
court also inquires into the jurisdiction of the court from which the case
is removed. When jurisdiction is concurrent, Congress may have desig-
nated certain types of state courts as the only appropriate state forums,
and thus the federal court's inquiry will focus on this conformity.4 When
jurisdiction is exclusively federal, the court must look to the subject
matter of the action to determine whether it is within the realm of the
exclusive jurisdiction, in which event no state court would be a proper
forum. In any case, the jurisdiction of the federal court upon removal is
derivative in nature.'
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
' Jurisdiction normally breaks down into two areas, jurisdiction over person
and jurisdiction over subject matter. Of the two, jurisdiction over subject matter
is the more important and is the topic of the text. Jurisdiction over person may be
waived either explicitly or implicitly by the parties, but jurisdiction over subject
matter cannot be. The federal courts strive not to let technical imperfections in
service of process interfere with hearing the case on the merits. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(h). On the other hand a federal court will take cognizance of a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion and will dismiss the case. Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
'E.g., Beckman v. Graves, 360 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1966). A farmer commenced
action in a Kansas county court to review the wheat marketing quota imposed on
him by his local committee pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
Defendant agricultural agent removed to federal district court where the action was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such action would have been properly brought
if filed in any state court having general jurisdiction, but in Kansas the state
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction while the county courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction. Since the action was instituted in the improper state court,
the circuit court affirmed the dismissal.
'Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377 (1922); accord,
Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943). The theory of derivative juris-
diction is not limited solely to the federal removal area. It has been applied in state
systems of justice, which rely on a dual judiciary. For instance, formerly in
North Carolina, justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction with
superior court on claims of less than $200. Appeal from the justice's court was to
the superior court and invoked a trial de novo. Even though the superior court
had original jurisdiction, the appeal would be dismissed if the justice of the peace
court had no jurisdiction since jurisdiction was entirely derivative. Hopkins v.
Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 27 S.E.2d 732 (1943). The recent reorganization of the
courts, resulting in a unitary system, should eradicate the doctrine in North Caro-
lina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4 (1969).
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Leesona Corp. v. Concordia Manufacturing Co.' is a recent federal
district court case illustrative of this doctrine. Leesona owned patents
which it licensed to certain manufacturers. One of the licensees, Kayser-
Roth Corporation, became concerned about the validity of the patents and
defaulted on a royalty payment. Prior experience had revealed to Leesona
that when one licensee defaulted on payments the remaining licensees dis-
continued payments also, pending settlement of the initial dispute. Ac-
cordingly Leesona waged simultaneous suits in the Rhode Island courts
with Kayser-Roth to recover damages for contract violation, and with some
sixty other licensees to determine the rights of the parties in order to
prevent default on payments. Leesona took a voluntary dismissal as to
the contracts action and then added Kayser-Roth as a defendant to the
second suit for construction of the contracts and declaration as to the
validity of the patents. The defendants removed to federal district court
in Rhode Island, and there offered five grounds for dismissal, one of
which was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants argued
that since suits concerning patent validity are to be tried exclusively in
the federal courts,7 the state court did not have original jurisdiction over
the suit; thus the federal court acquired none on removal. The court ruled
that indeed this was a suit designed primarily to test patent validity, not
one merely construing licensing agreements, and granted the motions to
dismiss.'
Leesona sharply outlines the paradox inherent in the derivative juris-
diction doctrine. When jurisdiction over a particular suit is exclusively
vested in the federal courts,9 and the suit is filed in a state court and then
removed, the federal court will not entertain the cause of action for lack
of jurisdiction. Since dismissal is without prejudice, the plaintiff may
return the next day and file his suit in the court that had previously dis-
missed it.Y0 The aim of this note is to explore the origin and development
of the doctrine and to assess the utility of its application in this context.
The earliest indication of the doctrine's existence appears in a rarely
312 F. Supp. 392 (D.R.I. 1970).
128 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
8312 F. Supp. at 397.
' Some of the areas of exclusive jurisdiction are the following: admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; bankruptcy proceedings; copyright cases; and special areas
such as litigation of ICC orders, federal antitrust actions, and federal tort claims.
See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (2d ed. 1970).
" For possible statute of limitations problems which plaintiff might encounter
see pp. 372-73 and notes 26-29 infra.
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cited dictum of Martin v. Hunters Lessee11 stating that the power of
removal is not strictly an exercise of original jurisdiction, but presupposes
that original jurisdiction has attached in the state court.12 Aside from this
rather dubious beginning there are two other recognizable sources of the
doctrine. One is in a technical reading of the removal statute-more spe-
cifically the interpretation of the word "suit,"'18 which appeared in place of
the term "civil action" 4 in earlier versions of the statute. Simply put, a
controversy is not a suit unless it is instituted in a court of competent
jurisdiciton. Hence a controversy being litigated in a state court having
improper jurisdiction never attains the status of a suit-a status necessary
if the requirements of the removal statute are to be met.15 Another source
frames itself in this obvious tautology: Any defense available in the state
court is available in the federal court after removal; the rights of the
parties are not changed by removal.' 6 In logical pursuit of this concept,
any claim of improper jurisdiction of the state court may be revived after
removal.
The Supreme Court in two 1922 opinions carefully defined the de-
rivative jurisdiction of the federal courts upon removalY Preceding
1 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
1 2This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of
the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power
necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power. The power of
removal is certainly not, in strictness of language [an exercise of original
jurisdiction]; it presupposes an exercise of original jurisdiction to have
attached elsewhere.
Id. at 349 (the bracketed portion does not appear in the United States Reports but
does appear in 4 L. Ed. 97, 108 (1816)).
" E.g., the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553:
any suit of a civil nature ... of which the circuit courts of the United States
are given original jurisdiction, which now may be pending, or which may
hereafter be brought, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant
to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district. (em-
phasis added)
1128 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), the text of which appears in note 2 supra.
"Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gill
Car Co., 25 F. 737 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885).
10 Compare Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872) with Wabash W. Ry.
v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271 (1896) and Cain v. Commercial Publishing Co., 232 U.S.
124 (1914). Possibly the earliest indication of availability of all state defenses was
in Gier v. Gregg, 10 F. Cas. 339 (No. 5406) (C.C.D. I1. 1847): "The case, when
removed from the state court to the circuit court of the United States, stands in
the latter court as it stood in the former, before the removal." Id.
17 The doctrine was already established in the lower courts. R.J. Darnell, Inc.
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 190 F. 656 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1911). See Sheldon v. Wabash
R.R., 105 F. 785 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900); Auracher v. Omaha & St. L.R.R., 102 F. 1




decisions had indicated the way,.8 but Lambert Run Coat Co. v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad9 and General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway"0 firmly established the doctrine. In Lambert the
plaintiff coal company filed suit in the state court to enjoin the railroad
from following certain rules of railroad car distribution prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The defendant removed to federal
district court which granted the injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit court's reversal of this decision and noted that the suit should
have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, since review of ICC orders
is to occur exclusively in the federal courts.2 ' The plaintiff in General
Investment sought to enjoin the merger of defendant railroads on the
grounds that such merger violated the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust
Acts. The defendants removed from the state court into federal district
court and asked for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
ruled that the suit was properly dismissed.2 Again Congress had provided
exclusive jurisdiction for federal courts over private suits filed under these
antitrust acts.m
In both Lambert and General Investment the federal court could have
properly entertained the actions if they had originally been brought
there. Since they had arrived via removal they were treated to the peculiar
twist exerted by the derivative jurisdiction doctrine--dismissal. The stance
of the Supreme Court has remained unchanged on this problem,24 and the
unswerving dedication of the lower federal courts 5 to the precedent estab-
lished in Lambert and General Investment indicates their reluctance to
depart judicially from the doctrine,
The primary justification for retention of the doctrine in its strictest
application is that it is a definite and accepted principle helping to define
the important area of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus it gives incentive
8American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916);
DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
*258 U.S. 377 (1922).
20260 U.S. 261 (1922).
21 Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219, currently embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§2321 (1964).
2 260 U.S. at 288: "When a cause is removed from a state court into a federal
court the latter takes it as it stood in the former. A want of jurisdiction in the state
court is not cured by the removal, but may be asserted after it is consummated."
"See Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731, currently
embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
"See Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943) ; Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
"Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1961); Keay v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1967).
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to plaintiffs' lawyers to file their complaints in the proper forum initially.
Yet in the early stages of a suit the issues may not be in sharp focus, and
it is often difficult for the lawyer to select the proper court. In Leesona
the plaintiff wanted its large number of licensees to continue to abide by
the contracts, which in turn depended on the validity of the patents. In
order to file suit in the proper forum, Leesona's lawyer had to decide
whether the action sounded in contract or in patent law. Since he was mis-
taken in his choice, the case was dismissed despite its subsequent removal
into the correct forum. There are harsher blows than dismissal without
prejudice, but such a ruling is nonetheless costly to the plaintiff whose
lawyer has expended considerable time and effort in futile argument.
If the plaintiff wishes to reinstitute proceedings in federal court, he
immediately encounters a possible statute of limitations problem. Although
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964) provides that after removal the state court
"shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded" and thus
presumably 6 tolls any statute of limitations where the state courts are
concerned, 7 it does not follow that this has effect where jurisdiction is
exclusively federal. In this case the federal cause of action is governed by
a federal statute of limitations, either specified by Congress or incorporated
into federal law from state law as a matter of policy.28 Since a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would seemingly designate all pro-
ceedings thus far a nullity, then the appropriate statute of limitations
would not have been tolled," and if the time limit has run before the
" This presumption arises because plaintiff is prevented from renewing his
efforts in the state court, notwithstanding that he intends to proceed in a correct
manner, until the federal court remands or dismisses. Thus, in State Hwy & Pub.
Works Comm'n v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 226 N.C. 371, 378-79, 38 S.E.2d
214, 219 (1946), where plaintiff was enjoined by federal court from proceeding
except in that jurisdiction and later had his suit dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, he was not barred by the statute of limitations from now proceeding in
state court. A federal statute enjoining proceedings in the state court would seem
to have equal if not greater weight than a court order.
' Thus in the fact situation of Beckman v. Graves, 360 F.2d 148 (10th Cir.
1966), plaintiff could return to a state court of general jurisdiction in Kansas,
confident that in the interval between removal and eventual dismissal in federal
court the statute was tolled.
"See 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[2] (1970).
" Black v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Mo.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 920 (1959). This would not necessarily be true if the appropriate statute
of limitations has a "saving" clause whcih extends the time period in the event that
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed or nonsuited before receiving a hearing on the
merits. Factor v. Carson, Pirie Scott & Co., 393 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1968); Lowry
v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 220 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1955); Johnson v.
United States, 68 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1934). A recent decision has held a statute of
[Vol. 49
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plaintiff refiles, his cause of action could very easily have been cut off
by the statute.
Assuming that the statute of limitations has not run, then a new com-
plaint must be drawn and filed with the accompanying lost office time and
recurring annoyances such as filing fees"° and service of process. In
Leesona, though an extreme example, there were some sixty defendants
who would have to be reached through methods of process available in
Rhode Island, entailing several hundred dollars in cost. The defendants,
while victorious in the tactical maneuvering, have won only a Pyrrhic
victory if the statute has not run and the plaintiff refiles since they face
corresponding expenses.
After refiling, the suit most likely will be placed towards the rear of
the court calendar. This delay when coupled with the loss of time caused
by removal, the dismissal arguments, and any wait plaintiff might have
taken before refiling means that a substantial period of time will have
passed before the merits of the controversy are reached. As a consequence,
evidence may be lost and witnesses may leave the jurisdiction or even die.
Furthermore it is axiomatic that an extended lapse of time decreases the
trustworthiness of oral testimony. The real danger is that the case will
become so stale that the true merits are never discovered adding credence
to Gladstone's maxim that "justice delayed is justice denied."31
The federal court system also has an interest in the refiling of a suit
after dismissal; the courts are over-burdened with litigation, and court
time is at a premium. A significant contribution to efficiency in the federal
district courts was made by the implementation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Promulgated by the Supreme Court, the rules are to be
construed "to secure the just, speedy, arid inexpensive determination of
every action."3 2 In view of this objective a contradiction bordering on the
absurd exists in a federal system of justice which so rigidly adheres to
the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. For a plaintiff who pursues his
claim, the likelihood is that the final determination will have been anything
but just, speedy, and inexpensive.
Conflict has occurred at least once between the policies underlying the
limitations tolled where federal court had jurisdiction but dismissed on grounds of
improper venue. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965)." The filing fee for civil actions in the federal district courts in North Carolina
is fifteen dollars.
11 As quoted in France, Judicial Reorganizaton-A Solution to Congestion, 68
DIcK. L. REv. 143 (1964).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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new rules and those behind derivative jurisdiction. In Freeman v. Bee
Machine Co.- the defendant removed a breach of contract action into
federal district court. The plaintiff promptly moved to amend in order to
add a Clayton Act claim for treble damages over which the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction. Based on the theory of derivative jurisdiction,
district courts had not previously allowed such joinder, 4 and the plain-
tiff's motion was accordingly denied. The circuit court reversed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided that
a properly removed suit should be treated as though it had been originally
commenced in district court. 5 Thus the federal rules controlled, not-
withstanding that such amendment would not have been allowed in the
state court." This approach is an effective circumvention of the principle
of derivative jurisdiction in the interests of judicial economy-the policy
underpinning the liberal joinder of claims.
Freeman marks the limits of progress made by the courts in under-
cutting the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. In view of this judicial re-
luctance, the American Law Institute has proposed the abolition of the
doctrine through act of Congress. 7 Under the ALI provisions, a suit
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, mistakenly com-
menced in the state courts, will not be dismissed upon removal for want
of jurisdiction but will be retained as having been properly removed. 8
Presumably, under these proposals speculation on the impact of a federal
statute of limitations would become moot since the plaintiff is spared
the unnecessary act of refiling.
In a dual judicial system, uncertainty in the area of original and con-
current jurisdiction will persist. Yet when the plaintiff in good faith
selects a state court and the defendant removes, for the federal court to
dismiss on the ground that it is the court of original jurisdiction is to exalt
form over substance. Among commentators who have addressed them-
selves to the problem, Professors Moore 9 and Wright" have expressed
distaste for this peculiar application of the doctrine. A correction certainly
S319 U.S. 448 (1943).2,Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
1937).
" Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 38, 36 Stat. 1098.
319 U.S. at 452.
, ALI STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouRTs §§ 1312(d), 1317(b), & 1382(e) (1969).
8 Id. Commentary to § 1312(d), at 206-207.
' 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 0.157(3), at 86 (1965).
WRIGHT, note 8 supra, at § 38.
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is in order, whether it be through judicial reconstruction of the removal
statute with an eye toward policy considerations prominent in this day, or
through act of Congress.
JOHN WOODWARD DE-Es
Income Taxation-Nondeductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenses
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that litigation expenses incurred by either individual stockholders1 or a
corporation2 in a statutory appraisal proceeding to value shares of dis-
senting shareholders were not deductible as nonbusiness3 or business4 ex-
penses. The holdings in Woodward v. Commissioner5 and United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp.6 resolved conflicting results reached earlier by the
eighth7 and seventh' circuits in essentially similar fact situations. The dis-
allowance of the claimed deductions in these cases may have significant
impact upon future corporate decisions regarding proposed alterations of
their corporate structures when there is a substantial likelihood of ap-
praisal proceedings being instituted. Moreover, the character of the
appraisal remedy itself as a protective device for the interests of dissenting
shareholders may be affected by the decisions.
In Woodward, taxpayers owning a majority of stock in a publishing
firm voted to extend the corporation's finite charter. The minority stock-
holder voted against the extension and, pursuant to Iowa law,9 majority
taxpayers negotiated to purchase the minority's stock interest. Following
1Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
2 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
3 INT. IEV. CODE of 1954, § 212 [hereinafter cited as § 212] provides in general:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses ... (1) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income; or (3) in connection with the deter-
mination, collection, or refund of any tax.
'IT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) [hereinafter cited as § 162] permits the
deduction of all ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses.
397 U.S. 572 (1970).
0397 U.S. 580 (1970).
Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
' Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
' IowA CODE ANN. §491.25 (1949), provides that the majority shareholders
voting for renewal "shall have three years from the date such action for renewal
was taken in which to purchase and pay for the stock voting against such renewal."
Although the Iowa statute would characterize the action taken by the majority
stockholders as a "renewal," in essence the action involved the creation of a per-
petual corporation from a fitite one.
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